Before we look at her argument, let us read the rest of the passage from Aristotle, and then apply his reasoning to the case of moral character in order to draw our own conclusion: Mitchell goes on to use this division to determine what character is. I call habits that according to which we experience emotion well or badly badly, as when we get angry too violently or not violently enough, well, when we feel a middle amount, and likewise for other emotions. I call abilities that in virtue of which we are able to feel, e.g., according to which we are able to feel anger or pain or pity. I call emotion desire, anger, fear, boldness, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, jealousy, pity, and generally those things which are accompanied by pleasure or pain. Since three things occur in the soul, passion/emotion, potencies/abilities, and habits, virtue must be one of these. Next to be considered is the definition of virtue. Mitchell begins her argument that character is a potency by summarizing what Aristotle says about a division that he sets forth in the Nicomachean Ethics (see Mitchell 2015, 154).
The Argument of the Nicomachean Ethics When Applied to Character Establishes That It Belongs in the Category of Habit
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Character is not itself a potency, but rather human beings have a potency to acquire a good or bad character due to the powers of the human soul, reason, and free will, along with the other appetites that are responsive to reason. I will then explain wherein a person’s potency for good or bad character lies. I will then show that this view cannot be sustained by reiterating two arguments provided earlier. Now one might concede that when Aquinas concludes that character is a power, he is not talking about moral character, yet still maintain that moral character is nonetheless a power. Secondly, I will show that the notion of character referred to in this passage is quite other than moral character. First, I will show that according to this passage, moral character should be categorized as a habit, and not as a power. I will then look at the specific text of Aquinas drawn from the Summa Theologiae (Aquinas 1953) that Mitchell relies on to conclude that moral character is a potency, as it is her reliance on this text that is the occasion for her error. I will then offer further support for this conclusion by considering how people commonly speak about moral character, including how Mitchell herself speaks about it. I intend to establish this by examining the text that Mitchell relies on in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (1982), thereby showing that if one applies the division Aristotle presents there to the case of character, it follows that character belongs in the category of habit.
My specific thesis is that moral character, rather than being a potency, is the sum of one’s moral habits and moral dispositions. Given the central role that the notion of character plays in the discipline of ethics and in living a moral life, the reader stands to gain knowledge that amply compensates for any extra expenditure of effort. Although my reasoning at times may strike the nonphilosopher as technical, much of it is based on common sense. 2 In this paper I intend to set forth a correct understanding of character. While I agree with these positions, I maintain that Mitchell is mistaken in identifying character as a potency. Her central theses are that the actions of a person who “is pressured or convinced or even willing to perform an action that considers to be bad or wrong” corrupts his character and, more generally, that one’s actions both impact on and reflect one’s character (Mitchell 2015, 149).
Louise Mitchell takes up the important topic of character in her article “Integrity and virtue: The forming of good character” (Mitchell 2015). 1 Although initially, it might seem advantageous for the person to do things such as rob people and spy on his competitors, upon further reflection one realizes that if he were to do so, he would destroy his character, his very self, in the process. He put before us a scenario in which a person has a magic ring that, when worn, makes him invisible, and thus allows him to commit any crime he wishes without being seen (Plato 1961, 359e–60d, 367e). Plato long ago raised the question of why one should refrain from wrong-doing. Moral character is a crucial notion in ethics.
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